More than two years after the date the NBER set for the end of the U.S. recession, U.S. employment growth remains sluggish, the housing market is moribund, and GDP has barely exceeded its pre-recession peak. Thus, attention is increasingly focusing on the determinants and characteristics of recoveries. Although research on the causes and types of recessions is legion, there has been surprisingly little academic work that concentrates on recoveries.
1 That said, two stylized facts have been frequently cited in the current policy discussion. The first is that recoveries from banking and financial crises are typically slow, reflecting impaired financial intermediation and the need for structural adjustment (see Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) ). The second is that the rate of growth following deep recessions is typically faster than average, given pent-up demand and large stocks of underutilized labor and capital. As the Great Recession was both a banking and financial crisis and associated with a deep decline in output, these stylized facts imply different trajectories for output growth in this recovery.
To address this uncertainty and to gain greater insight into the nature of recoveries, defined as output growth following recession troughs, we examine quarterly data on GDP over the past 40 years for almost 60 countries, split roughly evenly between the advanced and the emerging market economies, resulting in observations on 271 recessions. Classifying recessions according to whether or not they included a banking or financial (B&F) crisis we find, in contrast to earlier work, that there is little distinction in the pace of recovery across recession types.
Although recessions associated with B&F crises are typically more severe, the subsequent recoveries are not particularly unusual. Earlier work, finding the opposite, does so because it characterizes the pace of recoveries by averaging growth starting from the pre-recession cyclical peak rather than the recession trough, thus confounding the strength of the recession with the behavior of the recovery.
We do, however, find that, independent of whether a recession is associated with a banking or financial crisis, the depth and duration of the recession do have some predictive power for the pace of recoveries. Deeper recessions are associated with slightly stronger growth during the first three years of recovery. Recessions of greater duration are linked to slower post-trough performance. Also, recessions with large house price declines-a common but not omnipresent feature of long recessions-tend to recover slower than other recessions.
Because banking and financial crises are often both deep and long, these effects on the pace of recovery balance out, leading post-trough growth to be about average and implying that output declines during such severe recessions are not made up quickly. We confirm and extend earlier work showing that severe recessions are associated with sustained negative gaps in the level of output from pre-crisis trend and show that these gaps are attributable to reductions in the utilization of labor -particularly through employment and labor force participation rates.
Until recently in the United States, GDP growth was about on pace with the average recovery in the advanced economies. However, recently the path of output has veered below the average recovery and is well below what would be predicted given the depth and duration of the Great Recession. However, once the impact of the severe decline in housing prices is accounted for, the recovery becomes less surprising. In addition, the composition of the recovery has been unusual. 2 Exports and non-residential investment have outperformed the median recovery so far, but consumption, housing, and employment have languished. Looking more closely at these components, we find surprising strength in consumption of goods, in particular large durable goods such as cars and household furniture which one might think would be particularly restrained in this recovery. On the other hand, services consumption in almost every category is weaker than ever before in a post-war U.S. recovery. Likewise, even compared with other -jobless‖ recoveries, the weakness in employment is omnipresent and extreme.
Following this introduction, section II of the paper describes the dataset and recession classification system used. Section III presents our results, provides robustness checks, and contrasts our work with previous findings. Section IV focuses on characterizing and comparing the current U.S. recovery with past U.S. experience. Section V concludes.
II. Data and methodology
For our cross-country comparisons, our database contains an unbalanced panel of quarterly GDP data for 59 countries -26 advanced economies (AEs) and 33 emerging market economies (EMEs) -from 1970 (or whenever we begin to have quarterly GDP data) to present.
Most data are from national sources, and a full list of countries can be found in appendix A. For 2 The analysis of the U.S. data goes through the third quarter of 2011.
comparability across countries, recessions are classified as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth. If a single quarter of positive growth occurs surrounded by a recession on either side, it is included in the recession. The pre-recession peak is defined as the last quarter before the beginning of a recession while the recession trough is the last quarter of the recession. As will be discussed further, we check the robustness of our results using a variety of other recession-dating methodologies found in the literature including the Bry-Boschen procedure for quarterly data (henceforth called the BBQ method) as described by Harding and Pagan (2002) .
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Using our definition of recession, our sample contains 271 recessions; 137 occurring in the advanced economies and 134 in the emerging market economies (table 1) . If the Great
Recession is excluded, the sample of recessions is reduced to 224 episodes (116 AE and 108 EME). The greater number of AE recessions reflects the fact that quarterly GDP data are available for those countries earlier than for most of the EMEs. (See appendix B for data range for each country in our sample.)
In our analysis, we divide our sample by the type of economy -emerging market or advanced -and by type of recession. For comparability with earlier work, we match up the list of banking and financial crises found in IMF work by Laeven and Valencia (2008) with the list of recessions from the above procedure to identify if the downturn coincides with a currency, banking, or debt crisis. 4 Laeven and Valencia identify crises in the year of occurrence. For each recession, if a crisis occurred in a year during which the recession began or was ongoing, or if the recession began in the first or second quarter of a year immediately following a crisis, it was classified as being related to that crisis. Using this method, we identify 8 recessions in the advanced economies and 39 recessions in the emerging economies as being related to a crisis.
We also classify housing price slumps for a smaller sample of OECD countries for which we have a long time series of quarterly data on house prices. For these countries, we identify cycles in real house prices. Because the housing market is highly cyclical, most recessions are associated with periods of real house price decline. We identify periods of severe housing market stress as those associated with declines in real house prices above the median. We 3 The BBQ method identifies cyclical peaks and troughs as local maxima in the two quarters preceding and the two quarters following. It then eliminates maxima that do not alternate between peaks and troughs or do not have a long enough time span, in this case 2 quarters from a peak to trough and five quarters from a trough to peak. Once these criteria are met, recessions are defined as the time between a peak and a trough. We did not use this method because it requires at least 5 quarters of recovery, which would restrict and potentially bias our sample. 4 This is similar to the methodology used in the IMF WEO analysis on recessions and recoveries (Terrones et al. 2009 ).
identify 35 recessions associated with severe housing slumps in the advanced economies. A list of countries, recession dates, and recession types is found in appendix A.
As with other work in this area, much of our analysis will be in the form of butterfly charts, allowing us to compare the behavior of output around cyclical downturns across numerous recessions and countries. In our case, however, instead of indexing the output series for each recession to be 100 at the pre-recession peak, we index the level of GDP to 100 at the date of the recession trough. This allows us to isolate the trajectory of the recovery, which is the key focus of our paper. We typically look at the 12 quarters before and after the trough.
Because we have observations on so many recessions, it is not informative to chart individual recessions for most of our analysis. To summarize the cross-country experience, we calculate the mean value of output at each quarter across recession observations to construct the average path of GDP before and after the trough. Our results are not qualitatively different if medians are constructed. Using means allows us to create standard error bands around our average output paths.
III. Results

A. Banking and Financial Crises
As a first look, we construct the average path of GDP around recession troughs for our entire sample, excluding the Great Recession (figure 1). On average in a recession in our sample, output falls 4½ percent from the pre-recession peak to the trough. 5 GDP then rises at an average annual pace of 3¾ percent for the next three years, putting the level of output roughly 12 percent higher than at the trough. Splitting the sample between advanced economies and emerging market economies (figure 2), shows, not surprisingly, that the EMEs have more extreme cycles, both in terms of the severity of recessions and the rapidity of recoveries. For the average EME recession, output falls 6½ percent from peak to trough, compared to 2½ percent for the AEs. And the average annual pace of EME recovery is 5 percent over the three years following the trough, almost 2 percentage points faster than that in the AEs, leaving the level of output in the EMEs about 6 percentage points higher than that in the advanced economies.
As mentioned earlier, we have classified recessions by type, depending on whether they were associated with banking and financial crises. Over our sample, excluding the current recession, 8 advanced economies have experienced B&F crises out of a sample of 116 -or roughly 6½ percent of all AE recessions. 6 The frequency of banking and financial crises is a much higher 36 percent (or 39 out of 108) for the emerging market economies. Because of this, and the more pronounced behavior of output around EME recessions, we separate our sample into advanced and emerging market economies throughout the paper so country composition does not distort our conclusions.
As seen in figures 3 and 4, the pace of output growth upon exiting a recession, shown in the region to the right of the recession trough, is remarkably similar for both the advanced and emerging economies. Recoveries from banking and financial crises appear identical in pace to recoveries from other types of recessions. Table 2 presents the results of regressions of the level of GDP one, two, and three years after the trough on a constant and a dummy for whether the crisis was associated with a banking and financial crisis. For both the advanced economies and the emerging markets, the coefficient on banking and financial crises comes in highly
insignificant. There appears to be little evidence that the pace of output differs in recovery depending on whether the recession is related to a banking and financial crisis.
This result is surprising given the stylized fact and the standard interpretation of the previous empirical work (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens et al., 2008 and Terrones et al, IMF WEO, 2009 ) that finds that recoveries from banking crises are slow. 7 A key reason for the divergence in results is that earlier analysis has indexed the level of GDP to the pre-recession peak, rather than the trough. As can be seen in figures 3 and 4, there are significant differences in the severity of recessions associated with B&F crises. The red lines in the region to the left of the trough are all higher and fall more sharply. Indeed, running similar regressions on the level of GDP one, two, and three years prior to the trough show that the coefficient on banking and financial crises is large and significantly positive in most casesindicating a sharper decline during the recession for B&F crises (table 3) . Indexing to the peak confounds the strength of the recession and the behavior of the recovery, as can be seen when we 6 B&F recessions include Finland (1990 ), Iceland (1982 , Italy (1982) , Japan (1997), Norway (1991 ), Portugal (1982 , Spain (1978), and Sweden (1990) . 7 Complementary to our results, Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) find that recoveries are not systemically slower in the aftermath of financial crises in post-war United States.
re-index our data to the pre-recession peak (figures 5 and 6). Our results are consistent with findings that banking and financial crises are associated with greater declines in output and slower returns to pre-crises levels or trends, but this is because the recessions were deeper rather than because of disparities in the pace of recovery.
To confirm that indexing is central to our differences with the previous literature, we also ran robustness tests using the alternative methods of dating recessions and country samples for the AEs used in earlier work. 
B. Housing Slowdowns
Given the collapse in housing markets in a number of countries during the recent recession, we also looked at historical experiences with recoveries associated with severe slumps in housing markets. Our analysis is limited to the 18 advanced economies for which we could obtain reasonable historical data on housing markets and we define housing slumps simply in terms of changes in real house prices using quarterly OECD data starting in 1970.
The quarterly house price data are volatile, so to define a housing price slump we smooth each country's data using an HP filter with the low parameter of 100 and then look for local maxima and minima in the smoothed series. Returning to the unsmoothed data with the dates of the local peaks and troughs, we calculate the duration and depth of house price declines across the sample. Our methodology identifies 57 periods of house price declines, covering a significant portion of countries and time periods (occasionally across multiple recessions). For the United States (figure 11), this process identified four periods of real house price decline: the mid-1970s, the early 1980s, a brief period around 1990, and the most recent downturn. To classify a severe housing slump, we pick only the more sizable declines, those above the median.
(For the United States, only the current housing slump would be classified as severe.) In these cases, the decline in real house prices is greater than 19 percent. They last for an average of 6½ years and fall an average of 33 percent.
Our paper focuses on the cyclicality of GDP, not real house prices, so our final step is matching housing slumps to recessions. We do this simply: if any quarter of the recession overlaps with any quarter of the housing slump, we classify the recession as associated with a severe housing slump. There are 35 such recessions.
Dividing the OECD sample into recessions associated with severe housing slumps and those without reveals some interesting patterns. In particular, as shown in figure 12 , housingslump recessions tend to be longer and deeper and recoveries from these recessions are significantly slower. Table 4 runs a simple regression showing similar results.
C. Depth and Duration
Our result that the pace of growth after the trough of recessions associated with financial crises are similar to other recessions is somewhat surprising and leads to questions about what we know about recoveries following severe recessions more generally. In particular, how accurate is the second stylized fact that deep recessions are associated with faster bouncebacks?
To address the questions, we characterize all recessions in terms of their depth -the decline in the level of GDP from peak to trough -and duration -the number of quarters from peak to trough. Figures 13 and 14 present histograms of the depth of the recessions in our sample for the advanced and emerging market economies, along with selected summary statistics, excluding the Great Recession. As mentioned above, the average decline in output for the AEs is 2.6 percent, with 12 percent of recessions associated with declines of more than 5 percent. The right tail is even more elongated for the EMEs, with the average decline being 6.4 percent, but 17 percent of the sample seeing output loss of 10 percent or greater. Figures 15 and 16 present the same analysis for recession duration. Not surprisingly, for both sets of countries, there is a mass of recessions lasting 2 quarters (the duration of output decline that defines a recession in our work).
For the advanced economies, the average recession length is about 3 quarters with almost 30 percent of the sample experiencing output declines for a year or more. For the EMEs, the duration is more extreme. The average EME recession lasts a year, and 45 percent of recessions last more than a year with one, that for post-Soviet Russia, of almost 6 years.
In To provide a bit more rigorous look at this, table 5 presents the results of regressions of the level of GDP in the advanced economies one, two, and three years following a recession trough on the depth and duration of the recession, a dummy for whether the recession is associated with a banking or financial crisis, and a constant. Unlike with banking and financial crises, both depth and duration significantly affect the path of recovery, particularly in the first year. For example, for every 1 percentage point increase in recession depth, the level of output one year after the trough is a little over ½ percentage point greater. In contrast, a recession that is 1 quarter longer is associated with a similar-sized reduction in the pace of recovery. Over time, the drag from a longer recession appears to dissipate while the level of output is still roughly ½ percentage point higher following deep recessions. The results are even stronger for regressions on EME recessions (table 6) Table 7 details the summary statistics behind these charts. Prior to the Great Recession, the correlation between length and depth was .36 for the AEs and a much stronger .67 for EMEs.
D. Implications
What do our results imply should be the pace of the current recovery? To show this, we use the coefficients from our three regressions above to predict the pace of recovery at 4, 8, and 12 quarters past the trough based on observed depth and duration in the current recession 9 .
Figures 23 through 24 illustrate the results of this exercise. The solid black line represents the pace of recovery predicted for all AEs and EMEs, respectively, given the average depth and duration of the Great Recession and the red line represents the path of actual average AE or EME GDP in the current recovery. The pace of recovery in the AEs appears to be underperforming while that in the EMEs seems right on track.
Turning to the United States, figure 25 compares the current U.S. recovery to past recoveries in the advanced economies. Although the U.S. Great Recession was longer and deeper than almost all previous U.S. and advanced economy recessions and was accompanied by extreme financial disruptions, the U.S. recovery aligned well with average AE recoveries until the first half of 2011 when the pace of recovery slowed sharply. However, figure 26 shows that the actual path of recovery is well below what would be predicted by our simple model of depth and duration, suggesting other factors, possibly related to the financial crisis, may be at play this time around. 10 One could ask if generalization from overall AE experience to the U.S. economy is appropriate given its relatively high average growth rate and greater flexibility. In simple tests, however, we were unable to find compelling evidence that U.S. recoveries are typically faster than AE recoveries in general (tables 8 and 9).
E. Permanent versus Transitory, or Does the Economy Ever Actually "Recover"
Despite the differences in recovery rates we have highlighted above for recessions that are long or deep, recovery rates across recessions are still quite similar. This implies that long and deep recessions are associated with large and sustained losses to output. In particular, the economy will not return to its long-term trend, implying a persistent gap between the pre-crisis trend and the post-crisis level of output. This result is consistent with Cerra and Saxena (2008) which finds that large output losses associated with financial crises are highly persistent.
Our work also suggests that large declines in output over long periods of time can have more permanent effects on the level of output. For example, using the regression results for the advanced economies, the pace of recovery is the same after a recession of 2 quarters duration that results in a 2 percent decline in output and one of twice that length and duration -suggesting a greater potential permanent loss in output from the more severe recession.
To press this result further, we conduct a series of exercises to test whether output returns to pre-recession trend levels. To do this, we face both a conceptual and a practical challenge.
Often, macroeconomic data are detrended using HP or Kalman filters. Both of these techniques are two-sided moving average filters. This implies that the view of the past changes as the data evolves. In particular, and of great importance here, these detrending tools cannot accommodate a permanent deviation from trend. For this reason, we choose to use a simple exponential trend which can accommodate such long-lasting deviations. Even with this methodology, determining the appropriate pre-recession trend is somewhat tricky, to the extent that banking and financial crises are associated with bubbles or positive deviations from trend prior to the crisis. To avoid including the bubble in our trend, we calculate the four-year average growth rate for each country, two years prior to the peak, thus excluding the often rapid period of growth before the crisis. (The results are similar using average growth calculated over different pre-peak intervals.)
Having calculated a pre-recession trend, we then examine GDP as a percentage of this trend (figures 27 and 28) for the average recession and from particularly mild and severe recessions. Average GDP in the advanced economies never recovers to trend, even for short and shallow recessions. However, the average recession in the emerging economies does return to trend, and exceeds trend for short and shallow recessions. But, as for the AE recessions, for deep and long EME receesions, GDP does not drift back toward 100 percent of the pre-crisis trend, even after 10 years. For both AEs and EMEs, deep and long recessions lead to a sustained loss from pre-recession trend of about 8 to 10 percent after 10 years. While varying the specification of our regressions or the definition of pre-crisis trend can modify these loss estimates, these exercises all suggest a more sustained hit to output from severe recessions.
Another way of testing if GDP returns to its pre-crisis trend is to evaluate whether growth rates immediately after recessions differ from long-run average growth. We have examined this, first, by constructing scatterplots for the AE and EME countries of average growth over the sample for each country and average pace of growth three years after a recession trough (figures 29 and 30). If growth in recoveries proceeds at about average pace, then the points should line up close to the 45 degree line, indicating no quick return to pre-recession trend levels. In these charts, average growth seems very close to the pace of growth during recoveries. We also include a variable in our depth and duration regression to capture average pre-recession growth.
It is possible that countries with faster trend growth experience faster growth coming out of recoveries. If these countries are also associated with greater propensity (or less) to experience banking and financial crises, then our estimates of post-trough growth may be biased. As seen in in table 10, pre-crises growth rates come in statistically insignificant -suggesting the average pace of growth prior to the recession does not affect the post-recession recovery rate.
Shifting back to our comparison with Cerra and Saxena, they find that B&F crises lead to permanent losses in output. Given our results on depth and duration, one might ask whether their result is purely a reflection of the depth and duration of the downturns associated with financial crises or is there something special about financial crises above and beyond the contour of the downturn which leads to permanently lower output? There are differences in methodology and data between the two studies -Cerra and Saxena restrict their analysis to the initial shock stemming from the first year of a banking crisis, focus solely on banking crises (treating currency and debt crises as separate), use simulations from VAR analysis to estimate the impact of banking crises, and compare banking crises to non-crisis growth performance whereas we draw comparisons to other recessions. Despite these differences, we can shed some light on this question.
Using the sample of non-crisis recessions, we regress the level of post-trough GDP on the depth and duration of the crisis, similar to table 5, but with a sample restricted to non-crisis recessions and of course without the B&F crisis explanatory variable. This gives us a prediction for the recovery given a recession of a certain depth and duration. We use the model to create a prediction for a recovery after a non-B&F related recession that has the same depth and duration of an average B&F crisis. Finally, we compare the prediction to the average of actual outcomes of B&F crises. Figures 31 and 32 show that the average recovery and the prediction are almost
identical. There appears to be nothing inherently special about banking and financial crises that creates more of an output loss than similarly sized recessions unassociated with crises.
Combining this simple experiment with our earlier results, we conclude that any recession of similar magnitude to a B&F crisis may lead to sustained losses in the level of output.
F. A simple look at what doesn't recover
Our work above suggests that the level of GDP, particularly after long and deep recessions, does not recover to its pre-crisis trend even five years after the start of a recession, thus it is important to understand what is driving this sustained output loss. In general, even for the advanced economies, it is a challenge to get comparable quarterly time series data across countries to allow a more granular look at post-recession behavior. One exception is a dataset developed by and detailed in Ohanian and Raffo (2011) which contains quarterly information on total hours, labor-force participation, employment, and average weekly hours for 15 OECD countries from 1960 to the 2010. 11 With these data we can examine the broad supply-side components of output -total hours and output per hour -to see where the weakness in overall GDP lies following a recession. Figure 33 shows, for the smaller sample used here, the average behavior of the level of GDP as a percentage of pre-recession trend -divided into those that were particularly severe (in the top 25 th percentile of depth and duration) and all others. In both cases, the level of output fails to return to the pre-recession trend, with the gap being particularly sizable (about 7½ percent) for severe recessions. Figures 34 and 35 break output down into total hours and output per hour for both sets of recessions. Interestingly, for typical recessions, the loss in output is a reflection of declines in both productivity and labor input. In contrast, for severe recessions, the sustained deviation in the level of output from trend is more than entirely accounted for by a loss in total hours -productivity actually increases relative to trend.
We next decompose total hours into labor-force participation, the employment rate, and average weekly hours (figure 36 through 38). Interestingly, whereas the workweek returns and even exceeds its pre-recession trend relatively quickly, employment and labor-force participation rates remain depressed -particularly after long and deep recessions. These results suggest the decline in output relative to pre-crisis trend, especially after severe recessions, is importantly concentrated in a reduction in the utilization of labor. For particularly bad recessions, the reduction in the employment and labor force participation rates is sustained even five years after the pre-recession peak.
IV. The Current U.S. Recovery in More Detail
With the general knowledge of the features of recoveries in hand, we can now turn to characterizing the current U.S. recovery in more detail. The butterfly chart in figure 39 shows the evolution of U.S. GDP around the trough of every recession since 1947, separating the 1980s downturn into two recession periods. 12 The thick black line denotes the current recession. Only the downturn in 1980 had a more sluggish pace of recovery two years after the trough.
This anemic post-recession performance is not a reflection of weak outcomes in the manufacturing sector. After falling dramatically in the recent recession industrial production (figure 40) has since climbed at an about-average pace and real exports (figure 41) have surged nearly 25 percent. Non-residential investment (shown in figure 42 ) tells a similar story. The fall in investment was larger than in any previous recession, leaving a tremendous gap between the current level and the peak, but the pace of investment growth during the recovery has been on the high end of the more recent historical experiences.
On the other hand, unusually poor recovery is evident in consumption and housing. The The policy response in this recovery has been mixed. Monetary policy, even excluding long-term asset purchases and other non-traditional programs, has been larger than in most previous recoveries with the real federal funds rate (figure 57) remaining in negative territory two years after the recession trough. In contrast, government expenditures (figure 58), which had risen sharply during the recession, has leveled off noticeably since then especially compared with earlier recoveries. Further, although revenue fell more than in other recessions, the revenue growth following the recession is on the high end of previous recoveries (figure 59).
Finally, we apply similar supply-side analysis to the United States as above to the OECD countries. 13 Re-indexing to the peak and taking deviations from a simple exponential prerecession trend, shows that 2½ years after the recession trough the level of output in the United
States is strikingly below trend (figure 60). This gap is driven entirely by a lack of hours (figure 61), as labor productivity has returned to trend (figure 62). As with the OECD results more generally, this hours gap reflects a downshift in labor force participation and employment rather than the workweek (figure 63 to 65).
V. Conclusion
We take away several key points from our work on recoveries. First, whether a recession is associated with a banking or financial crisis does not have a statistically significant effect on the pace of growth following recession troughs. This result surprised us and raises questions for future research about the exact channels through which banking and financial crises affect growth. In comparison, as might be expected, recoveries from recessions associated with severe housing downturns are found to be slower. Third, we expand on earlier work in the literature that finds evidence that recessions, especially severe recessions, are associated with persistent negative deviations in the level of GDP from pre-crisis trend. This deviation appears to importantly reflect the lower utilization of labor, particularly a decline in employment and labor force participation rates from earlier trend levels. Going forward, it will be important to examine these results in line with what we know from the micro labor literature about skill deterioration, hysteresis, and long-term unemployment. Finally, we may need to reexamine the assumptions in many of our macro models that output levels eventually return to trend or reevaluate the concept of trend.
For the United States, the current recovery has been weaker than would have predicted based on the depth and duration of the recession alone. Without question, the labor market has performed particularly weakly -with especially tepid employment growth and a sharp decline in labor force participation. These developments raise questions about the financial and fiscal channels that affect labor demand and about the role of policy in the face of long and deep recessions. Table 2 is based on a simple linear regression of the form where x is one, two, or three years, and is a dummy variable for whether the recession was associated with a banking or financial crisis. A * indicates confidence at the 95 percent level, and a ** indicates confidence at a 99 percent level. Table 4 is based on a simple linear regression of the form where is a dummy variable for whether the recession was associated with a housing slump. Tables 5 and 6 are based on a simple linear regression of the form where Depth is a positive number measuring the fall in GDP during the recession as a percentage of peak GDP and Duration is the number of quarter from peak to trough. Table 9 is based on a simple linear regression of the form Tables 5 and 6 
